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 THE GDPR TRANSFER REGIME AND MODERN TECHNOLOGIES 
Melania Tudorica; Trix Mulder 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, the Netherlands 
 
ABSTRACT 
Health data comes within a person’s most intimate sphere 
[1]. It is therefore considered to be sensitive data due to the 
great impact it could have on a person’s life if this data 
were freely available. Unauthorized disclosure may lead to 
various forms of discrimination and violation of 
fundamental rights. Rapid modern technological 
developments bring enormous benefits to society. However, 
with this digitization, large amounts of health data are 
generated. This makes our health data vulnerable, 
especially when transferred across borders. The new EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) legal 
framework provides for rights for users of modern 
technologies (data subjects) and obligations for companies 
(controllers and processors) with regard to the processing 
of personal data. Chapter V of the GDPR protects personal 
data that are transferred to third countries, outside the EU. 
The term ‘transfer’ itself, however, is not defined by the 
GDPR. This paper examines whether transfer within the 
meaning of the GDPR applies to health data processed by 
modern technologies and if the complexity of the GDPR 
legal framework as such sufficiently reflects reality and 
protects health data that moves across borders, in 
particular to jurisdictions outside the EU. 
Keywords – Data protection, health data, transfer, transit 
1. INTRODUCTION1 
In our rapidly evolving digital world, people use various 
modern technologies to track and measure their health and 
fitness. Modern technologies such as mobile applications 
and wearables (including watches, bracelets and smart 
fashion) are used to get into shape, keep fit, lose weight, 
reduce stress, manage mental health disorders, test and 
diagnose for specific diseases such as malaria, help with 
family planning and ovulation tracking, etc. The 
technologies enable people to monitor their own health and 
fitness by entering personal health data and using (pressure) 
sensing technologies which measure vital signs (such as 
heartrate) and track progress (such as counting steps) [2]. 
New health technologies are a key area of 21st century 
knowledge societies and economies, offering potential for 
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growth and economic development [3]. It is one of the 
largest growing global markets. According to a recent 
article, there are more than 300 000 health related mobile 
device applications [4]. While the use of these technologies 
may bring benefits to society as they reduce the burden on 
doctors and empower people by putting them in control of 
their own health, in particular in low income and difficult to 
reach areas, the downside is that these technologies 
generate massive amounts of health data. Considering that 
health data comes within a person’s most intimate sphere, it 
could have a great impact on a person’s life if this data was 
freely available. Risks include discrimination and violation 
of fundamental rights.  
There have been many reports over the past couple of years 
or so of data breaches and companies (routinely) sharing 
data. The 2018 Strava and Polar incidents immediately 
come to mind, but also Ovia (a pregnancy tracking app) 
sharing intimate information with employers and insurers 
[6], Facebook having access to sensitive information [7] 
and many more examples of health data being 
compromised by the use of modern technologies [8]. Our 
health data is particularly vulnerable if it is processed 
outside the protected sphere of a medical environment 
where health data is processed by professionals who are 
under the obligation of medical confidentiality. The health 
data that is processed by these modern technologies is, most 
of the time, processed by commercial companies who are 
generally unclear about their processing activities and with 
whom they share the collected data [9].  
Legally a lot can be said about modern technologies, their 
use, privacy risks, infringements of rights, etc. This paper 
focusses specifically on transfer and modern technologies. 
Inherent to the nature of these technologies is that data is 
not bound by borders. Users of modern technologies may 
be located anywhere in the world and data may move 
across the globe while being processed by companies 
established anywhere in the world. One of the main 
challenges of the borderless nature of data processing is that 
it is difficult to track the data and as a consequence difficult 
to determine jurisdiction, which may lead to difficulties in 
data subjects exercising rights in cases of infringements.  
Within the European Union (EU) data is protected by the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [10]. The 
GDPR protects data, among other things, when it is 
transferred across borders. This research aims to answer 
how the GDPR transfer regime applies to data processing 
 by modern technologies, if at all, and whether the GDPR 
legal framework as such offers sufficient protection. When 
using modern technologies, the data is collected by a device 
(such as a smartphone or wearable) by using applications 
developed by commercial companies. The applications 
‘send’ the data to the servers of the company which owns 
the app and which then processes the data. What exactly 
happens technically behind the scenes is unclear. It is 
therefore unclear whether ‘sending’ data between the 
device and the server of a company can be seen as a 
transfer within the meaning of the GDPR and whether the 
GDPR transfer regime applies to processing by modern 
technologies. 
This research argues that the complexity of the GDPR legal 
framework does not offer sufficient protection against 
processing by modern technologies. By taking a technical, 
behind the scenes perspective and looking at whether the 
(technical) process of ‘sending’ data from a user’s device to 
the server of a company can be seen as a transfer within the 
meaning of the GDPR, we argue that this process is a mere 
transit of data where the device functions only as a tool for 
the companies to collect data [11]. In coming to this 
conclusion, this article first needs to establish what the legal 
basis for processing health data by modern technologies is. 
We then look at the technical process used by modern 
technologies and whether the GDPR transfer regime applies 
to this process in order to conclude whether the legal basis 
and the GDPR legal framework offer sufficient protection 
to processing by modern technologies. 
2. LEGAL BASIS FOR PROCESSING HEALTH 
DATA BY MODERN TECHNOLOGIES 
The GDPR provides rules for the protection of personal 
data and free movement of such data in order to protect the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of persons. It applies to 
the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in 
the EU, regardless of where the controller or processor are 
established [12]. This means that the GDPR applies to any 
company around the globe processing data of data subjects 
who are in the EU if the processing activities relate to 
offering goods or services to data subjects or monitoring the 
behavior of data subjects. As such, the GDPR aims at 
offering a similar level of protection for EU citizens 
regardless of where the data is being processed [13]. This is 
particularly important when health data is being processed 
by commercial companies who are not under any obligation 
of professional secrecy. In previous research we have 
established that many companies deny or at least do not 
mention the fact that they process health data while in fact 
they are [14].  
While we use the more overarching term health data, 
Article 4 (15) of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) refers to it as ‘data concerning health’ and defines 
it as: 
Personal data related to the physical or mental health of a 
natural person, including the provision of healthcare 
services which reveal information about health status [15].  
This is a very broad definition: any information which can 
reveal something about a person’s (mental) health is 
considered to be health data. In the annex to its letter to the 
European Commission, the Article 29 Working Party (now 
the European Data Protection Board [16]) clarified the 
scope of the definition of data concerning health in relation 
to lifestyle and wellbeing apps and provides criteria to 
determine when data processed by such apps and devices is 
health data [17]. According to the Article 29 Working Party, 
personal data is health data when (1) the data is clearly 
medical data, (2) the data is raw sensor data that can be 
used in itself or in combination with other data to draw a 
conclusion about the actual health status or health risk of a 
person or (3) conclusions are drawn about a person’s health 
status or health risk [18]. This means that, in general, data 
is health data when it is used or can be used to draw 
conclusions about a person’s health. However, the Article 
29 Working Party also acknowledges that in some cases the 
raw data itself is considered to be health data. It also 
acknowledges that presumably simple facts about 
individuals, such as IQ, wearing glasses or lenses, smoking 
and drinking habits, membership of patient support groups, 
etc. are considered to be health data. In our view, the mere 
fact that a person uses an app, for example to help quit 
smoking or to count calories already says a lot about a 
person. Whether or not true, the conclusion can be drawn 
that the person is a smoker or may be obese and that he or 
she may have health issues (such as lung or heart problems) 
because of this. The mere fact that a person uses a health 
app already can say a lot about their health, and even more 
so when the data is combined with other health information 
about a person. For example, an employer or insurer buying 
health data and combining it with the information already 
on record not only violates privacy but can also 
discriminate against their employee or the insured. This 
could lead to increases in insurance fees, rejection of 
insurance and perhaps even in unemployment. Data 
generated by modern technologies which can conclude 
something about a person’s health in the broadest sense can 
therefore generally be seen as health data. 
Health data has had a long history of being seen as a special 
category of data, also referred to as sensitive data, that 
requires additional protection. As such, Article 9 of the 
GDPR prohibits the processing of health data unless there is 
a legal basis to do so. If there is no legal basis for 
processing, the processing is considered to be unlawful. 
According to the GDPR, explicit consent given by the data 
subject is the legal basis for processing health data by 
modern technologies [20, 21]. The GDPR thus allows 
processing of personal health data by companies when a 
data subject explicitly consents. Consent of the data subject 
within the meaning of the GDPR means a clear affirmative 
act establishing at least the freely given, informed 
indication that the data subject agrees to the processing of 
his or her personal data [22]. Consent can also be given by 
 electronic means, for example by ticking a box when 
visiting a website, choosing certain technical settings or any 
other statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this 
context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed 
processing. Pre-ticked boxes or inactivity by the data 
subject do not constitute consent [23]. The request for 
consent has to be clear, concise, not unnecessarily 
disruptive and needs to be presented in a clearly 
distinguishable form, meaning that it may not be buried 
within the fine print of a privacy policy or contract [24].  
While at first sight it looks as if the GDPR offers sufficient 
protection against the processing of health data, the 
practical reality is quite different. Previous research has 
shown that companies offering health apps are by no means 
transparent about their processing activities and whom they 
share the data with [25]. While data subjects to some degree 
consent to data processing, some health apps do not even 
recognize the fact that they process health data, resulting in 
a lack of legal basis. As a result of this, risks of violation of 
rights and freedoms remain, as well as physical and 
practical challenges related to the use of modern 
technologies to process health data, such as jurisdiction and 
exercise of rights. 
3. BEHIND THE SCENES OF MODERN 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Processing personal data according to the GDPR includes 
‘collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, restriction, 
erasure or destruction’ of data [26]. This very broad 
definition means that basically any action performed on 
personal data is processing. The one word that is missing 
from the definition is transfer of data. What is however 
mentioned by the definition in Article 4 (2) GDPR is that 
processing also includes disclosing the data by transmission 
and dissemination or otherwise making it available. While 
it is interesting that transfer is not included in the definition 
for processing, disclosing and making data available can be 
seen as transfer of data.  
Transfer has an important role in the GDPR. While the free 
flow of information has always been promoted by data 
protection legal frameworks, the major concern was that 
data protection legislation could be circumvented by 
moving processing operations to countries with no or less 
strict data protection laws [27]. European data protection 
legal frameworks have therefore always been cautious 
about transferring data to third countries who are not part of 
the legal regime. In order to prevent data from being 
transferred to ‘data havens’, the principle of equivalent 
protection was introduced, meaning that there should be no 
restrictions on transborder data flows to states with legal 
regimes which ensure data protection equivalent to data 
protection offered by the GDPR. Chapter V of the GDPR is 
dedicated to transfers of personal data to third countries or 
international organisations. Modern technologies process 
data electronically, making it easy to transfer data across 
the globe. The data can be sent from one actor to another or 
made accessible to more than one actor in a blink of an eye. 
Modern technologies thus impact the way that personal 
health data can be collected. 
These modern technologies, such as mobile applications 
and wearables process large amounts of personal (health) 
data. The technologies make it possible to continuously 
monitor the user. Most people carry their mobile phone 
with them during the day and wearables made tracking even 
easier. A smart watch or smart glasses for example allow 
users to track their health and fitness with objects which are 
easy to carry. While making life and health easy for users, 
large amounts of health data become available to 
commercial companies who are by no means under any 
obligation of professional secrecy and what happens behind 
the scenes of these technologies is unknown to many. When 
unravelling what happens, behind the scenes, to the data we 
stumbled upon 2 major ways that the technologies function 
that are relevant for this article. Many health apps and 
wearables by default: 
1. collect data via an app and store it on the device 
itself until the user actively choses to send the data 
to a cloud or server;  
2. collect data via an app and store it on a (cloud) 
server. In this case the data exists outside of the 
app and is accessible to the developer, i.e. the 
device is used as a tool to collect data, the data can 
be seen separately from the app considering that it 
exists even if the app is deleted.  
If we picture a user in the first situation and we take the 
example of an app that counts how many steps someone 
takes during the day, the app counts the steps and stores the 
data on the device itself by default. The data is stored on the 
device for as long as the user does not delete the data or 
chooses to store the data somewhere else, for example 
when the storage space of the device is full. In other words, 
the collected data remain on the user’s device until the user 
actively decides to store the data elsewhere, outside of the 
app or wearable.  
More importantly for this research is however the second 
situation, where data is collected by an app or wearable 
which does not intend to store it on the device. Instead, by 
default, the data is sent to and stored on the (cloud) server 
of the app company. Sending the data requires an active 
connection between the device and the (cloud) server. If 
this connection is unavailable, the data is most likely stored 
on the device until the connection is available.  
There is a significant legal difference between the two 
situations. In the first situation the app is closely related to 
the data and therefore to the user, it is merely a means to an 
end. In the second situation, the purpose of the app or 
wearable is mainly to generate data. The device is not used 
for storage or not meant to be used for storage. As soon as 
an active connection is available, the data is sent to the 
 designated (cloud) server. In this regard, we can make an 
analogy with streaming data. The user might have the app 
on their mobile phone or wearable, but the data exists 
separately, outside this app. For example, when watching a 
YouTube video, the app is solely used to stream the data 
available on the YouTube server. While health apps and 
wearables are more of a two-way-street considering that 
they can also generate data, the basic concept and 
comparison to YouTube streaming is the same.  
Processing health data in a way where data is collected by 
an app or wearable and sent to a (cloud) server for (further) 
processing still leaves the question whether sending the 
data can be seen as a transfer within the meaning of the 
GDPR and is as such protected or whether the device 
functions merely as a tool for the companies to collect data 
where sending the data can be seen as a mere transit of data 
[28]. The concept of ‘transfer’ will therefore be discussed 
in the next paragraph.  
4. THE NOTION OF TRANSFER 
The GDPR aims at offering a similar level of data 
protection, regardless of where in the world data of data 
subjects who are in the EU is being processed. Therefore, 
Chapter V of the GDPR includes provisions on transfers of 
personal data to third countries. This section provides rules 
in order to ensure data protection equivalent to the GDPR, 
meaning that data may only be transferred to third countries 
outside the EU if the conditions of the GDPR are met. In 
short, this means that there needs to be: 1) an adequacy 
decision (such as the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield) or 2) 
appropriate safeguards or 3) that the data subject has given 
explicit consent for data processing in the third country. 
With emerging modern technologies, where data may be 
processed anywhere in the world, it is of the utmost 
importance to protect the data, in particular health data. In 
order to establish whether sending data, from the app or 
wearable onto the (cloud) server of a company for the 
purpose of being processed by that company, can be seen as 
a transfer within the meaning of the GDPR, it is important 
to establish what transfer exactly is in order to determine 
whether or not it falls under Chapter V GDPR and 
consequently whether or not health data in this regard is 
sufficiently protected. In literature transfer is described as 
to occur as a part of networked series of processes made to 
deliver a business result [29]. 
The GDPR is, however, unclear about what transfer is and 
does not provide a definition. What is clear is that it is a 
process where data moves between different actors. 
According to the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) in its position paper on transfer to third countries 
and international organizations by EU institutions and 
bodies, the lack of a definition leads to the assumption that 
the term needs to be used in its natural meaning. As such 
transfer means that data ‘moves’ between different users. 
However, as the EDPS also concludes, this is not always 
straight forward. According to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in the Lindqvist case, it is 
necessary to take account of both the technical nature of the 
operations carried out and of the purpose and structure of 
the provisions on transfer in EU legislation [30]. Taking 
into account the technical nature of processing operations, 
transfer, as such entails, among other things, the 
automatically or intentionally sending or accessing of 
information. Unfortunately, there is not a lot of case law in 
this regard to help further clarify the matter. If one of the 
factors determining what transfer is includes the technical 
nature by which it takes place, the question that arises is 
what technical circumstances can facilitate transfer. Council 
of Europe Convention 108 for the protection of individuals 
with regard to automatic processing of personal data [31] 
provides some insight in this regard. 
Convention 108 includes a chapter on transborder data 
flows and determines that the provisions apply to the 
transfer across national borders by whatever medium [32]. 
It is aimed at the free flow of information, regardless of 
frontiers, taking into account the wide variety of factors 
determining the way in which data is transferred. These 
factors include: the mode of representation of the data, their 
storage medium, way of transport, interface, the circuit 
followed and the relations between the sender and recipient 
[33]. According to the explanatory memorandum the way of 
transport includes physical transport, mail, and circuit-
switched or packet-switched telecommunications links. The 
interface, i.e. the point where two systems interact, can be, 
among other things, computer to terminal, computer to 
computer, and manual to computer. The circuit followed 
can be direct from the country of origin to the country of 
destination or via one or more countries of transit [34]. The 
explanatory report to the Modernized Convention provides 
some more clarity in determining that transborder data 
transfers occur when personal data is disclosed or made 
available to a recipient subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state or international organization. According to Article 2 (e) 
of the Convention a recipient is ‘a natural or legal person, 
public authority, service, agency or any other body to 
whom data are disclosed or made available. The GDPR 
definition of recipient is almost the same, determining that 
recipient means a natural or legal person, public authority, 
agency or another body, to which the personal data are 
disclosed, whether a third party or not’ [35]. The recipient 
thus receives the data or is given access to the data and can 
be a controller or a processor [36].  
When it comes to moving data, there are two main ways to 
technically do this, namely by exchanging or sharing data. 
According to Doan et al. data exchange is the process of 
taking data that is structured within the source database 
system and transforming it into data structured under a 
target database system [37]. In other words, the data is 
transformed so that it becomes compatible with other 
systems which receive an accurate representation of the 
source data. Exchange thus allows data to be shared 
between systems and programs. The introductory report for 
updating Recommendation No. R (97) 5 defines exchange 
as the communication of information to (a) clearly 
identified recipient(s) by a known transmitter (such as 
 secured e-mailing) [38]. When health data is exchanged, 
the data is sent from A to B using a transmitter. This can be 
an e-mail or other way of sending the data so that it can be 
read and used by B. Figure 1 below shows this process. In 
this case, A is the original controller of the health data and 
B becomes the new controller of the data and will build on 






Figure 1 – Exchange 
Data sharing on the other hand is making data available to 
others through a variety of mechanisms [39]. According to 
the introductory report for updating Recommendation No. 
R (97) 5 sharing is making information accessible to third 
parties not necessarily identified at the time of the pooling 
and according to a principle of permissions (such as shared 
electronic medical records) [40]. Figure 2 below shows 
how, in a sharing system, various recipients (A – H) can 
access the data for the purpose processing it. A – H are not 
necessarily known at the time of pooling and need 












Figure 2 – Sharing 
Both sharing and exchange of data are thus commanded by 
interoperable data processing systems and by common 
reference frameworks [40]. This allows health data to be 
moved or to be made accessible to a variety of actors. 
Considering that transfer can be automatically or 
intentionally sending information or making it accessible to 
a recipient by whatever medium, transfer can be both 
exchange and sharing of data. While exchange and sharing 
describe different ways of moving health data, both ways 
are a transfer of data. Taking the above-mentioned into 
account, the following conclusions can be drawn about 
transfer: 
• Transfer does not have a legal meaning. 
• Transfer has a natural meaning, i.e. data moves 
between users. 
• Transfer may be the exchange or sharing of data. 
• Data movement takes place by whatever medium. 
• Data is disclosed or made available to a recipient. 
5. TRANSFER OR TRANSIT? 
When applying the notion of transfer to our case, where 
health data is being processed by commercial companies by 
modern technologies and the data is sent from the user’s 
device to the (cloud) server of the company, sending this 
data can be seen as movement, even as an exchange of data 
between the user and the company, which takes place 
automatically and electronically. However, the GDPR 
applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects 
who are in the EU by a controller or processor regardless of 
whether the controller or processor is established in the EU. 
The actors in this case are the data subject who is the user 
of the app or wearable and the controller which is the 
company processing the data by modern technologies. The 
data subject does not determine the purpose and means and 
cannot be the controller of the data. Taking into account 
that the data exists separately from, i.e. outside the app, it is 
not the data subject who (actively) transfers the data to the 
company. The company as the controller cannot be both the 
controller of the data and the recipient to whom the data is 
disclosed. While sending the data may be seen as 
movement of data which can be a transfer of data, it 
remains difficult to classify processing by modern 
technologies as transfer of data. Consequentially, two 
questions arise. The first question is: if it is not a transfer of 
data, what is it then?  
The Article 29 Working Party in its 2010 opinion on 
applicable law [41] mentions transit through EU territory, 
for example by way of telecommunication networks or 
postal services which ensure that communications are 
reached in third countries. While the context is slightly 
different, in our view the analogy can be made with modern 
technologies. When data is processed by modern 
technologies, the processing may take place anywhere in 
the world. For the data to reach the (cloud) server, a transit 
from the device to the server is necessary. Like an envelope 
containing data sent by post to a company outside the EU 
where it will undergo processing, a transit is required for 
the data to reach its destination. The data is simply being 
passed on and not being processed along the way [42]. In 
this case sending the data from the user’s device to the 
(cloud) server of a company where it will undergo 
processing can be seen as a mere transit of data and cannot 
be classified as transfer within the meaning of the GDPR. 
The device on which the app is installed is a mere tool for 
companies to collect the data, which does not exist on the 
device, but on a (cloud) server owned by the company, 
which can be located anywhere in the world. 
 The second question is: if it is not transfer and the GDPR 
rules on transfer do not apply, is processing of health data 
by modern technologies sufficiently protected? Previous 
research [43] has shown that there is a gap between the 
GDPR and practical reality. There is a general lack of 
transparency from commercial companies about their 
processing activities, their purposes for processing, the 
quantity of health data processed, the location of storage 
and recipients the data is shared with. In particular, the 
sharing of data is of a great concern as the data is collected 
and shared with actors who are by no means under any 
obligation of professional secrecy and who sell the data to 
the highest bidder which may lead to various forms of 
discrimination, violation of fundamental rights and 
difficulties with exercising rights in case of infringements. 
This is even more concerning considering that people 
generally do not inform themselves before giving away 
their data and/ or choose convenience over privacy. It is the 
responsibility of companies to protect their users’ privacy; 
however, unfortunately they often fail to do so. Consent as 
a legal basis for processing health data by modern 
technologies is therefore not enough. As a result of this, the 
complexity of the GDPR legal framework does not offer 
sufficient protection for processing of health data by 
modern technologies. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The multitude of modern technologies that are available 
today process large amounts of health data. When 
processing data, controllers and processors need to abide by 
the GDPR, which requires that there needs to be a legal 
basis for processing. Commercial companies therefore need 
to request the users of their modern technologies for 
consent before being allowed to process health data. On 
many occasions, these companies collect data via an app 
and store it on a (cloud) server where it is being processed. 
The device is used as a tool to collect data and the data can 
be seen separately from the app considering that it exists 
outside of the app (even if the app is deleted) where it is 
accessible to the company. Taking into consideration that 
the data exists outside the app and that the data subject 
cannot be the controller of his or her own data, the transfer 
regime of the GDPR does not apply when the data is being 
sent from the device to the (cloud) server. This process is a 
mere transit of data.  
Considering that the GDPR transfer regime does not apply, 
the question is whether consent as a legal basis is enough. 
While the GDPR applies to the processing of the data of 
data subjects who are in the EU, regardless of where the 
controller or processor is established, the reality remains 
that it is more difficult to track data processed by modern 
technologies, i.e. where it is stored and with whom is it 
shared, which may result in discrimination and violation of 
rights. There is a general lack in transparency from 
companies as regards to their processing operations. 
Furthermore, informing people via privacy policies of 
modern technologies does not offer sufficient protection 
considering that most people do not actually read them [45]. 
And even if they were to read them, they might not 
understand the meaning or the risks involved. As such, 
people do not know what they are consenting to. Therefore, 
combining the fact that commercial companies are 
generally not transparent enough about their processing 
activities with the fact that users generally do not know 
what they are consenting to, results in a weak legal basis. 
As a consequence, violations take place more frequently 
than we would wish. 
As such, the complexity of the GDPR legal framework does 
not offer sufficient protection against data processing by 
modern technologies and commercial companies are not 
taking sufficient responsibility when processing health data. 
Perhaps the solution lies in prohibiting the use of health 
data in certain situations as suggested by Frank Pasquale 
[44]. A stricter approach, i.e. prohibiting the use of health 
data in certain situations, would at least be an incentive for 
companies not to violate the privacy of a person’s most 
intimate sphere. This approach will require further research 
on how to limit processing health data by modern 
technologies. The situations where it might be limited or 
prohibited would have to be defined. It is, however, our 
opinion that we need another way of looking at health data 
processed by modern technologies that would be beneficial 
to all parties and still protects rights and freedoms. 
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